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INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT LAW: KEY DEVELOPMENTS 2020—
PART I: ASSESSING THE TRADE AGENDA FOR GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT IN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
Christopher R. Yukins 
George Washington University Law School
Most of this past year’s major developments in international trade involving U.S. government procure-
ment – including the trade restraints imposed by President Donald Trump during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the Trump administration’s bellicose threats to depart from the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Government Procurement Agreement, and Trump’s increases to the Buy American Act’s price preferences 
– were overshadowed by Joe Biden’s victory in the November 2020 presidential elections. As in past post-
election reports, therefore, this year’s review will look more forward than back, and will suggest how the 
new Biden administration may approach trade issues in public procurement.
This piece will begin, though, with a quick review in Part I of major trade measures in procurement taken 
during the Trump administration – most of which were predictable from the time Trump was elected. In Part 
II, we will turn to the major trade challenges that face the Biden administration, in areas as diverse as climate 
change, cybersecurity and the protectionism in post-Brexit Europe. Part III will discuss how the Biden administra-
tion might address these challenges, and will focus especially on how the new administration might cooperate on 
these difficult issues with the United States’ allies abroad. Part IV will conclude that the Biden administration’s 
main challenge is restoring confidence abroad in the United States as a responsible trading partner in procure-
ment; once that goal is met, the more technical issues of trade in procurement will be much easier to address.
I. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION – EXIT ON TRAJECTORY 
In early 2017, at the dawn of the Trump administration, the author offered a series of predictions regard-
ing the trade measures in procurement that the new Trump administration might take. The predictions 
identified possible points of change in the existing trade regime, and for each possible point of change as-
sessed the costs (administrative and economic) against the potential political benefits (especially in Trump’s 
conservative base). Those changes with the lowest costs and the greatest benefits were the likeliest to ma-
terialize. By 2020 (the last full year of the Trump administration) those predictions had largely come true, 
see Christopher R. Yukins, International Procurement Law: Key Developments 2019 – Part I: How the Trump 
Administration May Reshape International Procurement Markets – Defense and Electronic Marketplaces, 
2020 Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 3, and by the end of the Trump administration in early 2021 
almost all had been realized, as the chart below shows.
Reprinted from Thomson ReuTeRs GoveRnmenT ConTRaCTs YeaR In RevIew CoveRInG 2020 ConfeRenCe BRIefs, 
with permission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2021. Further use without the permission of the pub-
lisher is prohibited. For further information about this publication, call 1-800-328-9352 or visit http://
legal.thomsonreuters.com.
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As predicted at the beginning of the Trump administration in early 
2017, the Trump administration pursued an aggressive policy of “economic 
nationalism” by:
• Renegotiating coverage under trade agreements: Over the course 
of four years, the Trump administration pursued a bumpy, uneven strategy 
regarding trade in procurement. 
° Transpacific Partnership/RCEP: President Trump first simply aban-
doned the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), which would have opened ac-
cess to new procurement markets around the Pacific rim. See David Smith, 
Trump Withdraws from Trans-Pacific Partnership Amid Flurry of Orders, 
The Guardian, Jan. 23, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
jan/23/donald-trump-first-orders-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp. The failure 
of the TPP helped open the door to the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), in which China (not the United States) is the leading 
power, and which provides relatively weak protections for procurement trade, 
see, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, RCEP: Very Modest Procurement Provisions (Nov. 
18, 2020), https://trade.djaghe.com/?cat=738. 
° NAFTA/USMCA: On this side of the Pacific, the Trump administra-
tion renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with 
Canada and Mexico, but Canada refused to join the procurement chapter in 
the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – which arguably left the 
United States with less access to the Canadian public procurement markets, 
because U.S. vendors would now have to rely solely on the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement to access those Canadian markets. See, e.g., Chris-
topher R. Yukins, International Procurement Developments in 2018 – Part IV: 
The United States in International Procurement: Understanding a Pause in 
the Trump Administration’s Protectionism, 2019 Gov. Con. Year in Rev. Br. 6.
° “On-shoring” Medical Supplies: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, 
President Trump announced that the United States would be “on-shoring” 
production and procurement of critical medical supplies, and that as a result 
those supplies would be removed from coverage (removed from the open 
market guarantees) under the Government Procurement Agreement. See, 
e.g., White House, Press Release: President Donald J. Trump is Ensuring that 
Essential Medical Supplies are Produced in the United States (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
ensuring-essential-medical-supplies-produced-united-states/. Removing those 
critical medical supplies from coverage may prompt a demand from other GPA 
member nations for offsetting concessions by the United States – either a 
reduction in the other members’ coverage, or further goods or services added 
to the U.S. list of items opened to foreign competition. What was surprising 
was that the Executive Order, E.O. 13944 (Aug. 6, 2020), 85 Fed. Reg. 49929, 
did not announce that the United States was “on-shoring” medical supplies as 
a national security or public health measure. Under Article III of the Govern-
ment Procurement Agreement, national security and public health measures 
are generally exempt from the Agreement’s obligations, and so “on-shoring” 
of critical medical supplies on those grounds might not have triggered offset-
ting demands by other members of the Government Procurement Agreement.
° In a final disturbing move, after the November 2020 election and just 
over 60 days before leaving office – the 60-day period required for notice – the 
Trump administration again signaled that the United States might withdraw 
from the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. See, e.g., Doug Palmer, 
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Lighthizer Wants U.S. To Reset Government Procurement, POLITICO, Nov. 
23, 2020, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-trade/2020/11/23/
lighthizer-wants-us-to-reset-government-procurement-agreement-791834. 
This threat had been raised earlier in 2020, see, e.g., Robert Anderson & 
Christopher Yukins, Feature Comment: Withdrawing the U.S. from the WTO 
GPA: Assessing Potential Damage to the U.S. and Its Contracting Commu-
nity, 62 Gov. Cont. ¶ 35 (Feb. 12, 2020), and ultimately came to naught, but 
caused frustration across the international trade community, see generally 
Colloquium: What Happens If the U.S. Leaves the WTO Government Pro-
curement Agreement (Feb. 9, 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.
com/2020/02/09/colloquium-what-happens-if-the-u-s-leaves-the-wto-govern-
ment-procurement-agreement/, in no small part because of the United States’ 
decades of work in establishing the GPA.
 There were two notable exceptions – points of procurement trade policy on 
which the Trump administration did not take action -- involving the defense 
trade and infrastructure: 
• Defense Trade: While the Trump administration left the defense trade 
largely alone, probably because U.S. defense firms enjoy a robust trade sur-
plus, see, e.g., Statista, U.S. Arms Exports in 2019, By Country, https://www.
statista.com/statistics/248552/us-arms-exports-by-country/, the European 
Union up-ended U.S. expectations when it launched the “European Defense 
Fund” and the “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO) initiatives, 
which, through government subsidies and procurement preferences, threat-
ened to give European defense firms a special advantage in selling arms to the 
European Union’s member states. This was arguably a violation of the many 
reciprocal defense procurement agreements between the United States and 
its allies in the European Union, which guarantee open markets in defense. 
See Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: European Commission Pro-
poses Expanding the European Defence Fund – A Major Potential Barrier to 
Transatlantic Defense Procurement, 60 Gov. Cont. ¶ 196 (2018). The European 
Defense Fund continues to move forward, albeit with reduced funding because 
of COVID-19 budgetary pressures. See Army Technology, European Defense 
Fund to Propel Consolidation of the Industry Despite Budget Cuts: Poll, Dec. 
22, 2020, https://www.army-technology.com/news/european-defense-fund-to-
propel-consolidation-of-the-industry-despite-budget-cuts-poll/. Furthermore, 
in October 2020 the European Union’s members reportedly agreed to allow 
vendors from other countries, such as the United States, to participate in 
PESCO projects if those countries provide “substantial added value” to the 
military project and share “the values on which the EU is founded.” See Alex-
andra Brzozowski, EU Seals Accord to Let Third Countries Into Future Joint 
Military Projects, EURACTIV.com, Nov. 10, 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/
section/defence-and-security/news/eu-seals-accord-to-let-third-countries-join-
future-joint-military-projects/. 
• Infrastructure: Although President Trump long pressed for major 
infrastructure legislation to rebuild the United States’ roads and business, 
ultimately that initiative failed to gain traction. See, e.g., Laura Bliss, How 
Trump’s $1 Trillion Infrastructure Pledge Added Up, Bloomberg CityLab, Nov. 
16, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-16/what-did-all-
those-infrastructure-weeks-add-up-to (“The Trump administration’s record on 
infrastructure is marked instead by over-hype and under-delivery.”). Candi-
date Joe Biden took up this cause in his own election campaign, and himself 
called for massive infrastructure legislation – and, as President Trump did, 
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Biden pressed for a strong “Buy American” preference in those construction 
projects, discussed below.
II. TRADE CHALLENGES IN PROCUREMENT FOR THE BIDEN 
ADMINISTRATION 
In some ways, predicting how the Biden administration will address trade 
issues in procurement is more difficult, because the new administration is 
less likely to be driven by the same simple elements that so clearly drove the 
Trump administration’s actions – maximum political benefits, with minimal 
costs. The Biden administration’s trade policies in procurement will need to 
accommodate many competing voices – the demands of labor unions in Biden’s 
base (for example) for “Buy American” policies, specific calls for sustainabil-
ity and security in procurement, and (above all) the need to reestablish the 
United States as a respected world power, especially after pro-Trump rioters 
overran the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.
A. Biden and “Buy American”
The Biden administration will inherit an administrative process, long 
expected and finally launched in July 2019 by Executive Order 13881 under 
President Trump, see, e.g., Steve Masiello, Gale Monahan & Norman Aspis, 
Feature Comment: Significant Changes in Government Contracts Domestic 
Preference Requirements May Be on the Horizon, 59 Gov. Cont. ¶ 79 (2017), 
to increase preferences under the Buy American Act. See 85 Fed. Reg. 56558 
(Sept. 14, 2020) (proposed implementing rule). Preferences under the Buy 
American Act would tighten, for example by increasing the applicable price 
preference from 12 percent to 30 percent for small businesses, and from 6 
percent to 20 percent for other businesses. 85 Fed. Reg. at 56559. The practi-
cal effect of these changes is likely to be limited, however, because per the 
international agreements implemented under Trade Agreements Act, the 
Buy American Act’s preferences are waived for larger procurements. See 
Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Trump Executive Order Calls 
for More Aggressive Use of the Buy American Act – An Order Likely to Have 
More Political Than Practical Effect, 61 Gov. Cont. ¶ 219 (July 31, 2019). As 
a result, per Government Accountability Office estimates, fewer than $10 
billion in federal purchases (of a total of approximately $500 billion per year) 
are subject to the Buy American Act. See id. (citing Government Account-
ability Office, Buy American Act: Actions Needed to Improve Exception and 
Waiver Reporting and Selected Agency Guidance (GAO-19-17), at 4-9 (Dec. 
2018), www.gao.gov/assets/700/696086.pdf).
Although President Trump’s efforts to strengthen the Buy American Act 
will likely have little practical impact, those Trump administration changes 
fully align with the incoming administration’s agenda. As a candidate, Joe 
Biden voiced strong support for tightening the rules which implement the 
Buy American Act. The Biden-Harris campaign website said, for example:
Biden starts with a pretty basic idea – when we spend taxpayer 
money, we should buy American products and support American 
jobs. Almost 90 years ago, Congress passed the Buy American Act 
to advance this basic idea. But we have never fully lived up to it.
The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future Is “Made in All of America” by All 
of America’s Workers, https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/.
The much broader question for the new Biden administration, though, 
will be how it handles “Buy American” policies more generally – in other 
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
  81
words, how it handles protectionism in the wake of the Trump administra-
tion’s hard-edged economic nationalism, carried out under the slogan “Buy 
American and Hire American.” See, e.g., E.O. 13788, Buy American and Hire 
American (April 18, 2017); Mitchell A. Bashur, George E. Stewart III, Dominick 
P. Weinkam, Current Challenges Facing Contractors Under Recent Changes 
to Domestic Preference Programs, Proc. Law. (ABA), Winter 2018, at 3; Stuart 
B. Nibley, Amy M. Conant & Erica L. Bakies, Feature Comment: Real Steps 
Towards “Buy American” Compliance – Part IV: What Comes Next?, 60 Gov. 
Contr. ¶ 181 (2018).
Throughout the campaign and the transition to the new presidency, 
Biden has made it very clear that the new administration will support “Buy 
American” policies in procurement. Labor unions strongly support these “Buy 
American” policies, and the unions also have emphasized the pivotal role they 
played in electing Joe Biden, especially in “swing” states such as Wisconsin, 
Michigan and Pennsylvania. In a press conference shortly after the election, 
for example, Richard Trumka, president of the largest federation of unions, 
the AFL-CIO, said:
Biden’s path to the White House ran through America’s labor 
movement. Initial toplines from our post-election survey show union 
members went 58 percent for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris. While 
the general public supported Biden by three points, our members 
favored him by 21 points.
Simply put, we got out the vote. In Wisconsin. In Michigan. In 
Pennsylvania.
Joe Biden’s firewall was union made!
Richard Trumka, AFL-CIO President, Press Conference, Nov. 5, 2021, 
https://aflcio.org/speeches/trumka-joe-bidens-firewall-was-union-made. As 
part of their support for Biden’s candidacy, unions argued forcefully for “Buy 
American” preferences in procurement. See, e.g. David J. Lynch, Jeff Stein, 
Eli Rosenberg & Andrew Freedman, Biden to name Rhode Island Gov. Gina 
Raimondo as commerce secretary, Boston Mayor Marty Walsh for labor, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 7, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/07/
biden-commerce-labor-cabinet/. 
The Biden-Harris campaign embraced this “Buy American” approach, see, 
e.g., The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future Is “Made in All of America” by All 
of America’s Workers, https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/ -- an approach 
which has strong popular support in the U.S. public. In a September 2020 
online survey of over 1000 respondents, fully 75 percent said “they support 
Buy American policies requiring the federal government to buy from domestic 
suppliers whenever possible,” and “[n]early half – 48 percent – [said] they 
‘strongly support’ the policy, while just 5 percent of Americans say they are 
either ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ opposed,” and “21 percent were ‘indifferent.’” 
Anne Kim, Americans Love to “Buy American” (TradeVistas/Hinrich Foun-
dation, Sept. 24, 2020). The survey data also suggested that the traditional 
Democratic/Republican divide on issues of domestic preferences – tradition-
ally, Republicans were far more likely to favor free trade policies – apparently 
flipped during the Trump administration, so that surveyed Republicans that 
strongly favor “Buy American” procurement policies (70%) substantially out-
numbered their Democratic counterparts (48%). 
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Chart: TradeVistas/Hinrich Foundation (based upon survey by Lincoln Park 
Strategies, results available at https://34t9wx3d3efh36333w49fxon-wpengine.
netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/National-Omnibus-MQ-Sept-2020-Trade-
Vistas.pdf). 
In supporting domestic preferences and broader unionization, the Biden 
campaign platform argued that federal infrastructure projects should en-
courage unionization and provide generous pay and benefits to workers, and 
should use U.S.-manufactured products:
Biden will ensure these investments create good, union jobs that 
expand the middle class. American workers should build American 
infrastructure and manufacture the materials that go into it, 
and all of these workers must have the choice to join a union and 
collectively bargain. . . . Biden will require that companies receiving 
procurement contracts are using taxpayer dollars to support good 
American jobs, including a commitment to pay at least $15 per hour, 
provide paid leave, maintain fair overtime and scheduling practices, 
and guarantee a choice to join a union and bargain collectively.
Biden-Harris Campaign, The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable 
Infrastructure and an Equitable Clean Energy Future, https://joebiden.com/
clean-energy/. 
The challenge for the incoming Biden administration, then, will be to bal-
ance these protectionist policies with its efforts to rebuild the United States’ 
standing with its allies – and to honor the United States’ many trade agree-
ments which open foreign access to U.S. procurement markets. The person 
who may stand at the center of this policy debate is Katherine Tai, a widely 
respected trade expert from the House Ways & Means Committee staff who 
President-elect Biden announced will be nominated to serve as the new U.S. 
Trade Representative, see Ana Swanson, Biden Picks Katherine Tai as Trade 
Representative, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/
business/economy/katherine-tai-us-trade-representative.html. Katherine Tai 
has promised to make trade “a force for good,” see Gavin Bade & Doug Palmer, 
USTR Pick Tai Aims to Make Trade “A Force for Good,” POLITICO, Dec. 14, 
2020, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-trade/2020/12/14/ustr-pick-
tai-aims-to-make-trade-a-force-for-good-792253, which in procurement will 
mean reconciling any protectionist measures (in infrastructure legislation, 
for example) with the United States’ international commitments. 
 One ready means of honoring existing trade agreements would be to 
carve those international commitments out of any new infrastructure-funding 
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
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legislation, much as Congress did with Section 1605 of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009. Failing to honor the existing trade 
agreements could invite retaliation from trading partners such as the Eu-
ropean Union (see the accompanying piece in this volume by Pascal Friton); 
accommodating those international obligations, in contrast, will make it easier 
for the Biden administration to cooperate with other nations to address two 
of the most difficult issues in trade and procurement, global warming and 
cybersecurity.
B. Addressing Global Warming Through Procurement 
As a successful candidate transitioning to the White House, President-
Elect Joe Biden has made clear that climate change also will be a core priority 
of his administration. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley & Lisa Friedman, For Biden’s 
Economic Team, an Early Focus on Climate, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2020, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/business/biden-global-warming-economic-team.
html. After the election, Biden announced that former Secretary of State John 
Kerry (who was himself once the Democratic nominee for president) will 
serve as the new administration’s lead on climate change issues. E.g., Rebecca 
Beitsch, Biden Names John Kerry as “Climate Czar” in New Administration, 
The Hill, Nov. 23, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/527189-
biden-selects-john-kerry-for-climate-czar. 
There has been relatively little progress in the Trump administration in 
environmental sustainability in procurement, see generally Webinar -- Cur-
rent Challenges and Opportunities for Green Public Procurement (Sept. 30, 
2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/09/09/webinar-green-
public-procurement/, cf., e.g., Katherine M. Urban, Sustainable Acquisition 
and the Post-Conflict Environment: Why Adopting a Federal Sustainable Pro-
curement Policy for Post-Conflict Environments That Mirrors Those Adopted 
by Some Local Governments Would Help Lead to Mission Success, 44 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 261, 269 (2015) (chronicling prior administrations’ progress). For 
the Biden administration, there are at least two likely pathways to address 
global warming through procurement reforms:
• Tighten Eco-Label Requirements: First, and probably most simply, 
the government could tighten the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)’s exist-
ing requirement regarding labels that identify environmentally sound goods and 
services – “eco-labels,” as they’re known internationally. See generally Romeo N. 
Niyongere, European-Style Green Public Procurement in the American Context: 
What It Could Look Like, 49 Pub. Cont. L.J. 785 (2020). The European Union’s 
procurement directives endorse eco-label requirements, where appropriate, see, 
e.g., European Commission, Eco-Labels and Green Public Procurement, https://
ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/ecolabel-and-green-public-procurement.
html, and the FAR similarly calls for agencies to use eco-labels, see FAR 23.103, 
48 CFR § 23.103. In practice, however, the FAR essentially allows agencies to 
exempt themselves from the eco-label requirement, because only 95 percent of 
procurements must use eco-labels – and the FAR does not define the exempt 
five percent. As a result, under current law it is almost impossible to raise a 
challenge to a procurement that ignores the eco-label requirement, and notably 
there are no reported GAO bid protest decisions raising such a challenge. Cf. 
Alvarez LLC, Comp. Gen. B-418367.6 (June 2, 2020) (agency reasonably found 
eco-label requirement was met). To close this gap in the law and encourage 
the use of eco-labels, the new administration could require that eco-labels be 
used in all appropriate procurements. A much broader use of eco-labels could 
NOTES
© 2021 Thomson Reuters   84
raise trade issues, however, for eco-labels are not uniform the world over; there 
are hundreds of eco-labels in use globally, see, e.g., Ashleigh Rodriguez, There 
Are More Than 450 Meanings Behind “Green” Labels (Oct. 10, 2015), https://
qz.com/521251/there-are-more-than-450-meanings-behind-green-labels/, and 
those in common use in Europe are not necessarily the same as those in the 
United States. See, e.g., EU Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU, para. 75 (en-
dorsing use of “European Ecolabel”). To reduce these artificial trade barriers, 
the Biden administration would have several options. The United States could, 
for example, cooperate with foreign governments to identify common eco-label 
standards. See generally Bogdana Neamtu & Dacian C. Dragos, Sustainable 
Public Procurement: The Use of Eco-Labels, 10 Eur. Proc. & Pub. Priv. Part. L. 
Rev. 92 (2015). Another approach would be to establish a process, perhaps on a 
procurement-by-procurement basis, under which foreign vendors could demon-
strate that their goods and services met environmental standards equivalent 
to those established by the FAR. Cf., e.g., DFARS 252.204-7008, Compliance 
with Safeguarding Covered Defense Information Controls (vendor can show 
cybersecurity standards it meets are comparable to NIST cybersecurity stan-
dards required under clause).
• Assessing for Environmental Impacts: While the eco-label puzzle 
is relatively easy to solve, the probable next step in environmentally sound 
procurement – a requirement that a purchasing agency weigh, as part of a 
technical evaluation, the environmental impacts (such as carbon gas emis-
sions) attributable to the good or service under review, in order to encourage 
sustainability – will be more difficult. Cf. Nathan S. Page, Leeding the Charge: 
Using Green Builder Set-Asides to Expand Sustainable Construction and De-
sign, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 373 (2010) (arguing for use of contractor qualification 
to further environmental goals). Notably, many states and cities across the 
United States already assess for sustainability when they procure, see, e.g., 
Lauren Olmstead, A Common Taxonomy for Carbon: How States and Cities 
Use Public Procurement to Combat Climate Change, 49 Pub. Cont. L.J. 691, 
693 (2020) (“State and local governments have now been put in the position 
to ‘lead by example’ and use their purchasing power to advance the goals of 
GPP [Green Public Procurement.”), as does Canada, see David M. Attwater, 
Promoting Sustainable Development with Canadian Public Procurement, 44 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 79, 86 (2014) (“Under the [Canadian] Green Policy, environ-
mental performance considerations are integrated into procurement processes, 
instruments, policies, and procedures in the same manner as other value 
considerations such as cost, performance, quality, availability, after-sales 
service, and technical support.”). Incorporating “green” procurement goals 
into assessments for award will mean updating the Obama administration’s 
2010 blueprint for environmental sustainability in procurement, see U.S. 
General Services Administration, Executive Order 13514 Section 13: Recom-
mendations for Vendor and Contractor Emissions (April 2010), https://www.
gsa.gov/cdnstatic/GSA_Section13_FinalReport_040510_v2.pdf, and reaching 
consensus on how to harness commercial measures of greenhouse gases to 
reduce global warming. The federal government’s embrace of “green public 
procurement” would send a profoundly important message across private 
markets, making clear both the need and the practicability of reducing green-
house gas emissions through enhanced procurement practices. At the same 
time, however, the federal government would need to work closely with other 
governments both in the United States and abroad to ensure that new U.S. 
technical requirements, though intended to reduce global warming, did not 
raise inadvertent barriers to global trade.
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
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C. Strengthening Cybersecurity
By necessity, another major task before the Biden administration is to 
strengthen cybersecurity. In the wake of massive breaches such as the “Solar-
Winds” hack, see, e.g., Associated Press, Massive SolarWinds Hack May Have 
Exposed America’s Biggest Secrets, Dec. 15, 2020, https://www.marketwatch.
com/story/massive-solarwinds-hack-may-have-exposed-americas-biggest-
secrets-01608076875, the new administration may well impose new cyber-
security requirements on both agencies and their contractors. Those new 
requirements are likely to address the theft of government and industrial 
secrets. The measures may go farther, however, as part of a broader effort to 
exclude certain foreign (such as Chinese) companies in an ongoing geopolitical 
battle for global technological and economic leadership. While strong (even 
discriminatory) measures to protect national security are countenanced by 
the trade agreements, see, e.g, WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 
Art. III, measures meant merely to further (or preserve) a nation’s standing 
may be challenged as illegal barriers to trade. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The 
Internet of Things Cybersecurity Challenge to Trade and Investment: Trust 
and Verify? (April 18, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374542. 
D. Emerging Protectionism Abroad
Finally, the Biden administration will need to address nascent protec-
tionism in other nations – often inspired, ironically, by the Trump adminis-
tration’s own economic nationalism, and its loud support of “America First” 
protectionism. There are examples from around the world of this new wave of 
protectionism – the Malaysian bumiputera protectionism for ethnic Malays, 
for example, accepted and incorporated as part of the Transpacific Partnership 
(TPP), see Jean Heilman Grier, TPP Procurement: Malaysia’s Commitments 
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://trade.djaghe.com/?p=2277, or the European Union’s 
“white paper” on “leveling” trading advantages by sanctioning vendors that 
receive foreign government sanctions (discussed below), see European Com-
mission, Foreign Subsidies, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/
overview/foreign_subsidies.html, and the European Defense Fund previously 
discussed (an indirect preference and subsidy for European defense firms, 
despite the market-opening commitments under the U.S. reciprocal defense 
procurement agreements with its allies). This relatively recent wave of protec-
tionist measures complicates the trade picture substantially, and the United 
States may conclude that a new round of trade negotiations, perhaps under 
the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, is necessary to reconcile and 
resolve these new forms of protectionism.
III. MOVING FORWARD: LEADING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
POLICY AND COORDINATION
Taken together, the international procurement trade agenda for the new 
Biden administration will be both challenging and diverse. The question, 
then, is how best to tackle this agenda – which agency should take the lead, 
for example, and what type of international cooperation might work well to 
reduce trade barriers and enhance best value.
Resolving which federal agency should take the lead on these interna-
tional trade issues is not easy. While the U.S. Department of State regularly 
addresses procurement issues in working with other nations, coordinating 
procurement policies on issues such as cybersecurity and sustainability has 
never been a core mission for the State Department. The lead U.S. agency on 
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international trade issues, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), 
has been focused on the Trump White House’s aggressive protectionism. While 
there are mechanisms for the USTR to pursue international cooperation un-
der existing trade agreements, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Government Procurement Agreement’s working groups discussed above, see 
also Jean Heilman Grier, The Government Procurement Agreement Under the 
World Trade Organization: A Djaghe Reference Paper, at 23-25 (Jan. 2020), 
https://app.box.com/s/4fhlq5r0nageqp8kudlr1nbnw7e3s6e0, little public 
progress has been made through those channels in recent years. The U.S. 
Commerce Department supports the USTR in trade negotiations, but (aside 
from the Commerce Department’s Commercial Law Development Program, 
a capacity-building initiative) has not played a significant public role in 
international procurement issues. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency 
(USTDA) leads export initiatives abroad, including in government procure-
ment, but does not coordinate international efforts to reduce trade barriers 
in procurement, such as in environmental sustainability. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has an abiding interest in “green procurement,” see 
EPA, Sustainable Marketplace: Greener Products and Services, https://www.
epa.gov/greenerproducts, but plays no sustained role in international affairs 
regarding procurement. The agency with the most experience in procurement, 
the Defense Department, coordinates free trade agreements regarding trade 
in defense materiel and services with U.S. allies (the reciprocal defense pro-
curement agreements referenced above). The Defense Department naturally 
has a deep understanding of cybersecurity, but plays no regular coordinating 
role on broader trade issues such as environmental sustainability. The agency 
with core expertise in procurement, the General Services Administration 
(GSA), has never played a leading role in international trade issues. That 
leaves the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in the White House 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). During the Trump administration, 
however, OFPP has remained relatively quiet, and that office has never played 
a prominent public role in international procurement matters.
To resolve which agenc(ies) should lead this next phase of international 
coordination, perhaps it would be useful to identify what must be done – what 
types of international cooperation are necessary to reduce trade barriers 
and encourage new nations to use best practices, such as in cybersecurity 
and sustainable procurement. To make sense of that very complicated ques-
tion, we can look to the different types of potential regulatory cooperation 
that nations can undertake, as described in several studies published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). See A. 
Correia de Brito, C. Kauffmann & J. Pelkmans, The Contribution of Mutual 
Recognition to International Regulatory Co-operation (OECD 2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm56fqsfxmx-en (citing OECD, International Regulatory 
Co-operation – Addressing Global Challenges, at 23-25 (2013), http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/97892642004663-en). Addressing the relevant modes of regula-
tory cooperation in turn, beginning with the easiest to achieve:
• Dialogue/Informal Exchange of Information: The simplest ap-
proach would be to engage in informal dialogues with highly industrialized 
trading partners, such as the European Union and Canada – though other 
nations such as Ghana, which is pursuing environmental sustainability in 
procurement, see, e.g., Akosua Nyantakyi, Preparing Today for Prosperity 
Tomorrow: Using Sustainable Public Procurement as a Tool for Development 
in Ghana, 48 Pub. Cont. L.J. 377 (2019), might wish to join these discussions 
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as well. Among many of the industrialized nations, there is already a forum 
for those types of discussions in public procurement: the established (but 
so far largely quiescent) “work programmes” established under the World 
Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement (discussed above), 
including a work program dedicated to sustainability. https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_wk_prog_e.htm. This type of informal interna-
tional dialogue would be critical as the United States and its allies mapped 
out measures to take against new cybersecurity threats, and to address global 
warming.
• Soft law; principles, guidelines, codes of conduct: Early discus-
sions would help shape norms and principles for closer cooperation between 
nations. For cybersecurity issues, for example, it would be important to sort 
out from the start whether foreign vendors that are not compliant with unique 
U.S. cybersecurity standards may rely upon parallel cybersecurity standards 
from abroad. See, e.g, Jayme Selinger, Protectionism or Perfectionism: Explor-
ing The International Trade Implications of DoD’s Cybersecurity Maturity 
Model Certification (draft Jan. 2021), https://publicprocurementinternational.
com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Jayme-Selinger-CMMC-and-Trade-Bar-
riers-1.12.2021.pdf. Non-discriminatory standards (such as eco-labels) will 
also be important to make environmental sustainability work, and nations 
will need to decide, early on, whether to rely on commercial standards for 
measuring greenhouse gas emissions when making public purchases.
• Recognition and Incorporation of International Standards: 
With regard to cybersecurity, the next step in the international discussions 
would likely be to assess whether the U.S. standards, which are generally 
written by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), should 
be coordinated with internationally recognized cybersecurity standards such 
as those published by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). See, e.g., Cyber Consortium, Comments on Federal Determination of 
Industry Best Practices, Docket No. 130208119-3119-01) (April 2013) (sug-
gesting possible strategies for transatlantic cooperation in accommodating 
common cybersecurity standards, under what was then proposed to be the 
Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP)).
• Formal Requirements to Consider Relevant Frameworks in 
Other Jurisdictions in the Same Field: The next step in this continuum 
of regulatory cooperation would be a formal requirement to consider foreign 
jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks. In cybersecurity, the Defense Depart-
ment already does this for non-classified systems: under DFARS 252.204-7012, 
Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting, for 
example, a vendor may propose alternative cybersecurity protections, which 
the Defense Department’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) will consider for 
equivalence. The same sort of flexible (and monitored) reciprocity presumably 
could be used for environmental sustainability measures, such as eco-labels.
• Trans-governmental networks of regulators: Notably, to imple-
ment the Defense Department’s CMMC initiative, the Defense Department 
is already considering the next level of regulatory cooperation – trans-gov-
ernmental networks of regulators. Because of security concerns, some foreign 
vendors have objected to any requirement that third-party assessors under 
the CMMC initiative be allowed to inspect foreign facilities. To resolve this, 
the U.S. Defense Department may authorize “trans-governmental” regula-
tors – foreign inspectors, approved by the Defense Department – to inspect 
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vendor facilities in foreign jurisdictions for cybersecurity. See U.S. Department 
of Defense, CMMC Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 25 (“DoD is working 
with international partners to coordinate on potential bilateral agreements 
between CMMC and their respective cybersecurity requirements and assess-
ments”).
To achieve these basic levels of regulatory cooperation, trade negotiators 
in the Biden administration probably would need to coordinate closely with 
subject-matter experts in other agencies, and stakeholders outside the govern-
ment. To proceed farther in the OECD continuum of regulatory cooperation 
– for example, to enter into mutual recognition agreements, to form regional 
agreements to address cybersecurity or sustainability, to leverage inter-
governmental organizations such as the OECD for cooperation, or to enter 
into formal regulatory co-operation partnerships (such as the U.S.-Canada 
Regulatory Cooperation Council, https://www.trade.gov/rcc) – probably would 
require substantial interagency cooperation in the U.S. government, with 
extensive outreach to industry and other stakeholders.
Regulatory cooperation might need to go further, to include renegotiated 
trade agreements which built safe harbors for new initiatives, for example in 
cybersecurity and environmental sustainability. The Biden-Harris campaign 
page (https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/) said that “Biden will work with 
allies to modernize international trade rules and associated domestic regu-
lations regarding government procurement to make sure that the U.S. and 
allies can use their own taxpayer dollars to spur investment in their own 
countries” – a clear signal that while the Biden administration will honor 
trade agreements, the new administration stands prepared to revise trade 
agreements to accommodate changes in domestic preference policies, both in 
the United States and abroad.
 There may be an immediate need to renegotiate trade agreements (or 
at least to engage with trading partners under those agreements) because 
of shifts in a post-Brexit European Union. The European Commission has 
launched an initiative to sanction foreign vendors that receive government 
“subsidies.” See generally Webinar – European Commission “White Paper” 
on Foreign Government Subsidies (Dec. 1, 2020) (background materials), 
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/11/10/webinar-european-
commission-white-paper-on-foreign-government-subsidies-december-1-2020/. 
While this EU initiative is aimed primarily at China and the departing United 
Kingdom, see, e.g., UK Parliament, EU White Paper on the “Level Playing Field”: 
Addressing Distortions Caused by Foreign Subsidies (July 22, 2020), https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmeuleg/229-xiii/22904.
htm, the initiative could affect U.S. companies as well, because of the vague 
definition of sanctionable government “subsidies.” To shield U.S. contractors 
from sanctions, the United States may choose to negotiate under the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement to make clear that special economic 
supports afforded U.S. contractors (such as the emergency relief afforded 
during the COVID-19 pandemic) do not constitute sanctionable government 
subsidies. See, e.g., Andrea Biondi, Luca Rubini, Michael Bowsher, Christopher 
Yukins & Gabriele Carovano, Guest Post: “The EU Gives Foreign Subsidies 
Its Best Shot”: One Take on White Paper on Levelling the Playing Field as 
Regards Foreign Subsidies, Int’l Economic Law & Policy (Oct. 2020), https://
ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/10/guest-post-the-eu-gives-foreign-subsidies-its-
best-shot-one-take-on-white-paper-on-levelling-the-pla.html; Christopher 
Yukins & Kristen Ittig, Feature Comment, Maximizing Recovery: Contractor 
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Recovery for COVID-19 Paid Leave Under § 3610 of the CARES Act, 62 GC 
¶ 156 (June 10, 2020); Desiree U. Klingler, Government Purchasing During 
COVID-19 and Recessions: How Expansionary Legal Policies Can Stimulate 
the Economy, 50 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2020). 
Rewriting trade agreements would be one of the more serious options 
along the continuum of cooperation suggested by the OECD. In the key areas 
involving procurement which will demand international cooperation in the 
coming years – cybersecurity and environmental sustainability, for example 
– coordination with other powers is likely to begin with informal dialogue, 
and then may advance to more serious regulatory cooperation; that, in turn, 
may require centralized coordination in the Biden administration. While in 
principle individual agencies, here and abroad, could coordinate on narrow 
technical issues (much as the U.S. Access Board coordinated accessibility 
standards with input from European authorities, see U.S. General Services 
Administration, International Harmonization, https://www.section508.gov/
manage/laws-and-policies/international; Zero Project Innovative Policy 2018 
on Accessibility, Harmonization of ICT standards Across the Atlantic, https://
zeroproject.org/policy/pol183058usaeu-factsheet/), a coordinated approach 
across government would be more likely to succeed. 
During the course of the Biden administration, therefore, an agency 
with clear authority over procurement and trade – the USTR or the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy, perhaps – may take a lead role in coordinating 
with other nations on procurement trade policy. Having a strong lead agency, 
vested with authority and with a real understanding of procurement, will be 
especially important if other issues in procurement – such as transborder 
exchanges of information to counter corruption – become part of the ongoing 
discussions among nations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Following on the chaos of the Trump administration, the Biden admin-
istration will face numerous challenges in international procurement and 
trade. First, to restore the international community’s respect for the United 
States as a trusted partner, the Biden administration will need to convince the 
United States’ trading partners that U.S. policy will be based on cooperation, 
not confrontation. In that vein, if the Biden administration intends to apply 
domestic preferences to public procurement – under a massive infrastructure 
initiative, for example – the new administration will need to manage those 
preferences within a framework of existing free trade commitments. The new 
administration also will need to sort out how best to coordinate procurement 
policy with other nations on key international initiatives, such as global 
warming and cybersecurity. To make that work, the Biden administration will 
need to foresee how cooperation may unfold, and decide who in government 
should take the lead in that cooperation. But given the United States’ rich 
history in this area – for most of the years since World War II, the United 
States has been a leader in reshaping public procurement internationally, 
see, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Erod-
ing the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l 
L. 529, 562 (2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002446 – the incoming Biden 
administration has a strong historical foundation for success.
